Abstract. Intrusion detection on mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) is in its early stages. In this paper, we show how grammatical evolution can be used to evolve detection programs for dropping attacks, a particularly important attack type for such networks.
Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-configuring network of mobile nodes connected by wireless links. MANETs do not have any fixed and preestablished infrastructure such as centralised management or base stations in wireless networks. The union of nodes forms an arbitrary network topology that changes frequently due to the mobility of the nodes. In addition, the nodes must cooperate with each other to provide essential networking. Mobile nodes that are within each other's radio range can communicate directly via wireless links, while those that are far apart must rely on other nodes to forward their messages. Since they provide communication even in the absence of a fixed infrastructure, they are very attractive for many applications such as rescue operations, tactical operations, environmental monitoring, conferences, and the like.
Attempts to design intrusion detection systems for MANETs to date are typically carried out entirely by the designer. However, humans are not particularly adept at selecting good choices when complex tradeoffs have to be made. Accordingly we propose to investigate the use of an artificial intelligence based learning technique to explore this difficult design space. In this paper, grammatical evolution (GE) is explored as a technique to detect known attacks on MANETs. Detection rules are evolved to detect a known type of attack on MANETs (dropping attack) and evaluated on networks with varying mobility and traffic patterns.
Grammatical Evolution in Intrusion Detection on MANETs

The Problem
In this paper, we use grammatical evolution [1] to evolve detection rules for dropping attacks on MANETs. In the dropping attack scenario malicious node(s) drop data packets not destined for themselves to disrupt the network connection. Since malicious nodes need to be on a routing path to drop data packets, they have little reason to drop routing protocol control packets such as RREQ, RREP, and RERR messages used in route discovery and maintenance mechanisms of AODV. So, it is assumed that malicious nodes do not drop routing protocol control packets. While packet losses usually occur due to congestion in wired networks, there can be other causes on MANETs. Major causes of packet losses on MANETs are given as wireless link transmission errors, mobility and congestion in [2] .
Transmission errors depend on the physical characteristics of the channel and the terrain, and they can not be eliminated or reduced by improving routing protocols [2] . Packet losses due to mobility are the result of one of the main characteristics of MANETs. Mobility of the nodes changes network topology and frequently makes existing routes inactive. Situations like buffer overflows, broken links, and no route to the destination can occur due to mobility and cause packets to be dropped. Lastly, packet losses due to congestion occur when the demands exceeds the capacity of a communication link [2] .
Mobility is given as the major cause of packet losses on AODV [2] . It is shown that more than 60% of total packet loss on AODV is due to mobility. We mainly aim to differentiate packet dropping due to malicious behaviour from packet dropping due to mobility in this paper.
The Method
We evolve a program to detect dropping attacks on MANETs. The evolved program is distributed to each node on the network. We assume that dropping attacks can be detected by the neighbours of the malicious node who sent/forwarded packets to the malicious node, but has not received any acknowledgement from it for a while. Moreover, an attack is assumed to be detected in a time interval ∆ after it has occurred. Since features are gathered every time interval by each node locally, a sliding window mechanism, which includes all features in ∆, is applied for training and testing the evolved program.
The detect window shown in Figure 1 below is defined as the window that consists of the network features available during the period of length ∆ after a dropping attack has occurred. For training purposes we assume that an ideal evolved IDS program should flag the occurrence of an attack precisely ∆ seconds after the attack has finished (i.e. using the feature data available during the detect window), at the detect point t D . It should flag "no attack" at or before the attack begins and also after more than ∆ seconds after it has finished (i.e after the detect point). At all other times we do not care whether the evolved program flags "attack" or "no attack". This means that in the training process programs that can detect some attacks earlier than ∆ units after they have finished are not punished for doing so. Additionally our training assumes that a network "returns to normality" at ∆+1 seconds after an attack has finished. This is a very straightforward evaluation approach for experimental purposes. Other choices for desired flagging profiles are clearly possible. Grammar The grammar used to evolve a program to detect dropping attacks on MANETs and raise an alarm is defined in Table 1 : Table 1 . BNF grammar used for the problem S = <code> <code> ::= if(<condition>) raise alarm() <cond> ::= <cond> <set-op> <condition> | <expr> <rel-op> <expr> <expr> Features used in the grammar are given in Appendix A. We use both mobilityrelated features as well as packet-related features as input to the evolution system. While some of these features give information about mobility directly (such as changes in the number of neighbours), some of them can be the result of mobility (such as added routes in the last period). Packet-related features include routing protocol control packets and transport protocol packets. AODV [5] , which is one of the most commonly used on-demand routing protocols on MANETs, is used in this paper. Because TCP expects acknowledgement packets from the destination and lack of acknowledgements may indicate dropping attacks, it is chosen as a transport layer protocol. All features are gathered periodically at every second by each node.
Fitness Function As evaluation measures we use detection rate (the ratio of correctly detected intrusions to the total intrusions on the network) and false positives rate (the ratio of normal activities which are incorrectly marked as intrusions to the total normal activities on the network). Low false positive rate is as important as high detection rate for a good intrusion detection system. That's why the constant k (=4) in the fitness function is used for decreasing the false positive rate.
F itness = detection rate − k * f alse positive rate
(1)
GE parameters The parameters used in GE are given in Table 2 . The feature set in Appendix A A Fitness cases:
The given sample of network data marked malicious or non-malicious Raw Fitness:
The detection rate over the fitness cases subtract the false positive rate over the fitness cases Standardised Fitness:
Same as raw fitness Parameters Populations Size = 100 Termination when Generations= 1000 Prob. Mutation = 0.02, Prob. Crossover = 0.9 Steady State
Experiment and Results
The evolved program is evaluated on the networks simulated by ns-2 [3]. Mobility of the nodes is simulated by the Random Waypoint model which is created using BonnMotion [4] . In the Random Waypoint model, each node moves from its current location to a random new location with random speed and pause time in determined speed/pause time limits [6] . Different network scenarios are created with different mobility levels and traffic loads. The parameters of the network simulation are given in Table 3 . The algorithm is evolved using the training data collected from a network under medium mobility with 30 TCP connections. The same network with dropping attacks and without attacks are used for training to reduce false positives. Evolved programs are evaluated on different network scenarios and the results are presented in Table 4 . There are two different networks under medium mobility in Table, which are simulated with different mobility and traffic patterns, since one of them is used for evolution. In the results, false positives increase in proportion to the mobility (as expected). False positives also increase under high traffic loads (which can be a source of non-malicious packet loss). 
Conclusion
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